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The Times of Archaeology and Archaeologies of Time 
Andrew Gardner 
Institute of Archaeology, UCL. 
The subject matter of archaeology as a discipline is explicitly structured by time, and ‘time-
travel’ is a common feature of popular discourses about the study of the past.  Yet archaeology 
is also the discipline which, amongst its other theoretical shortcomings, has singularly failed to 
develop any theory of time.  Chronology is ever-present as a measuring tool, but only in rare 
cases has there been any consideration of this as but one, culturally-specific kind of temporal-
ity among many others experienced by people in their daily lives.  In this paper, I will discuss 
various perspectives on archaeological times, including more sophisticated approaches devel-
oped since the later 1980s, and argue for an abandoning of the dualism between ‘measured’ 
and ‘experienced’ times which has emerged in some of these more critical attempts to grapple 
with the issue.  Time is fundamental to archaeology, but not just because we ‘use’ dates.  
Rather, archaeologists should be able to contribute to wider discussions of time from their 
understandings of the materialized temporalities of past human agents, and to develop perspec-
tives on the importance of these to the very nature of human social agency as a form of en-
gagement with the world. 
Introduction: Archaeology as Time-Travel 
Time is one of the key elements in most attempts to define archaeology’s discipli-
nary distinctiveness.  Other people may study human societies, but along with the 
unique emphasis on material culture it is ‘time-depth’ that makes archaeological per-
spectives singular and, arguably, capable of contributing something to debates in 
other social sciences (e.g. Binford 1962, 219; Hodder 1991, 191-92).  Time is an all-
pervading theme in what archaeologists do, insofar as chronology and dating under-
pin comparative and interpretative statements about contemporaneity or sequence, 
and thus change and continuity.  This temporal preoccupation also informs popular 
discourses of archaeology as ‘time-travel’, or of archaeologists as ‘time detec-
tives’ (e.g. Fagan 1995; Lewis et al. 2000).  It is perhaps, therefore, unsurprising that 
such a fundamental issue has been taken for granted, and largely escaped the grow-
ing attention that archaeologists, since the early 1960s, have directed against their 
base assumptions.  While the last decade has certainly seen significant developments 
in evaluating the conceptual underpinnings of archaeology, including those concern-
ing time, this particular ‘dimension’ remains for many either a landscape of dates 
within which to situate artefacts, sites or cultures, or a misty barrier to the act of 
communion with ancient people.  In both cases, time is effectively reduced to space. 
Indeed, this ‘spatial’ view of time constituted the focal point of some of the early 
criticisms of existing time-concepts in archaeology (Shanks and Tilley 1987a, 118-
36; 1992, 7-16; cf. Bailey 1983, 170-1; Fabian 1983, 16).  These critiques were well-
founded and effective in unmasking the dominance of one particular version of tem-
porality over potentially diverse alternatives.  However, as we will see below, they 
have led to the establishment of something of a dichotomy between different kinds 
of time – measured/abstract/natural versus experienced/subjective/social – which is a 
central theme of this paper.  In discussing the way in which this dualism has been put 
forward, I will argue that, while usefully exposing the blindness of previous scholar-
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ship to anything other than ‘clock time’, such oppositions must be dissolved in order 
to progress with the development of an understanding of time – or rather timing, as 
an activity and not an object – that cuts right to the heart of the nature of human 
agency (Adam 1990, 44-5; Elias 1992, 42-4).  Both ‘types’ of time can be regarded 
simply as mutually-dependent aspects of timing, which, as we will see below, is a 
fundamental feature of the relationship between humans and the world around them. 
This brings archaeologists face-to-face not only with long-standing debates about the 
character of time which have taken place in many other disciplines, including anthro-
pology, physics and philosophy, but also with the task of overcoming the dichotomy 
between nature and culture which has pervaded the Western world-view since the 
Enlightenment (Thomas 1996, 11).  In confronting these issues, archaeologists might 
begin to make more of both of the defining features of their discipline, as mentioned 
above, by exploring some of the ways in which time can be understood not as a thing 
– neither river, arrow, cycle or line – but rather as an aspect of human practice, and 
by tackling the relationship between people and material culture in generating such 
temporality.  We can begin to move towards such an understanding by reviewing 
earlier approaches to time in archaeology. 
Traditional and Processual Times 
Generally speaking, the dominant time-concept in traditional and processual archae-
ologies from the beginning of the 20th century to at least the 1970s has been that of 
measured chronology, implicitly assumed to be Time itself.  From the cultural se-
quences of V.G. Childe to the cost-benefit time-zones of the palaeoeconomists’ site 
catchment analyses (Champion 1980, 118-19; Trigger 1989, 170-72), time was a 
container for human action, a universal dimension which could be divided into uni-
form units (like geometric space), and used thus as a tool for archaeological inquiry, 
and as a way of understanding past behaviour (Shanks and Tilley 1987a, 118-19).  
This idea of time essentially owes much to that of classical physics, and particularly 
the work of Newton.  Absolute Time is here the frame within which the laws of mo-
tion work, and though itself quantifiable and measurable, it is placed outside of the 
action, being “unaffected by the transformation it describes” (Adam 1990, 50).  This 
is the kind of time that archaeologists use when they refer to processes or events hap-
pening within the particular framework of calendar years established in the Western 
world, in statements such as ‘this type of pottery was produced between the 80s and 
120s CE’, or ‘Britain underwent a major transition during the fifth century CE’.  The 
time of the calendar is not impacted upon in any way by the social processes it is 
used to describe. 
However, such abstract, ‘natural’ time has actually only become established as such 
by virtue of social convention.  Newton himself only assumed that time was an abso-
lute dimension, and many subsequent developments in physics have challenged the 
universal validity of this assumption (Prigogine 1980, 3-4; Adam 1990, 51).  None-
theless, such a theoretical abstraction worked in the context of industrialization, 
through the clocks which have ever since been used to measure out time in industrial 
societies.  While the measurement of time per se is by no means a unique feature of 
such societies (nor the only way of conceptualising time in them; Adam 1994), its 
standardization and commodification is historically specific.  Greenwich Mean Time 
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was adopted as a national standard in Britain in the 1840s, primarily in the interests 
of synchronizing railway timetables; before this point, local times were commonly 
divergent (Urry 2000, 111).  19th century employment legislation equally reflects the 
struggle between employers and factory workers over the regulation and commodifi-
cation of work-time (Rule 1999). 
Within archaeology, we can also trace the construction of the ‘natural’ Time which 
became the uncriticized norm for much of the 20th century, from the extension of 
antiquity beyond the chronology of the Bible, during the 19th century, to the radio-
carbon revolution and the subsequent use of different scientific ‘measuring sticks’, 
with different degrees of accuracy and different applicabilities (e.g. to organic or 
inorganic materials).  As long as such times – like those of historical sources or of 
traditional style chronologies – are simply calibrated to the BC/AD (BCE/CE) time-
line, temporality in the past remains unexplored.  Moreover, the treatment of this 
time-line as the objective reality within which human action takes place is simply a 
reification of what might actually be seen as the most socially-constructed form of 
time (Adam 1990, 154).  While more recent post-processual and cognitive-
processual studies (e.g. Hodder 1993; Gosden 1994; Renfrew 1994, 7; Thomas 1996) 
have brought variant temporalities more centrally into focus, and Annales-influenced 
archaeologists (e.g. Bintliff (ed.) 1991) have also tried to work with different time-
scales appropriate to different tempos of change (cf. Bailey 1987), the relationship 
between ‘social’ and ‘natural’ times remains problematic; this is the subject of the 
next section. 
Dualisms of Time: ‘Natural’ and ‘Social’  
The reliance on chronological time as ‘real’ Time in traditional and processual ar-
chaeologies was based upon an implicit acceptance of the orthodoxy of the classical 
natural sciences.  However, early attempts to criticize the universality of such an 
understanding – and contrast it with the time of experience (Shanks and Tilley 
1987a: 128; 1987b, 35-6) – have also inadvertently reinforced a dualism, between 
natural and social times, of long-standing in philosophy and the social sciences, 
which is worth exploring in some depth.  An appropriate point from which to begin 
to illustrate this dichotomy is the influential distinction between A- and B-series 
times made by John McTaggart, writing in the early 20th century (Adam 1990, 20-2; 
Gell 1992, 149-74).  McTaggart was mainly interested in time as a logical problem, 
and tried to construct an argument to prove that time is not a real quality of the uni-
verse.  This argument need not detain us here; suffice it to say that the two kinds of 
time McTaggart attempted to differentiate were ‘time as a fixed chain of events’ (the 
B-series), and ‘time as past, present and future’ (the A-series) (fig. 1). 
The former is more readily associated with abstracted, measured time, being the un-
changing before/after relationship between unique events: the 5th of June 2001 will 
always be before the 20th of June 2001, and after the 25th of May 2001, regardless of 
which day it is when we talk about these events.  In contrast, the temporal character 
of the A-series is one of constant change, and tends to be linked to the human experi-
ence of events as moving between future, present and past.  Thus the 5th of June 2001 
has moved from my future, through the present and into the past; it may also be re-
called into the present through memory, while a future 5th June may be anticipated. 
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As we will see below, this dichotomy is based upon a flawed understanding of the 
nature of the interaction of social beings with the world.  Nonetheless, not only has 
this specific conception of dualistic time informed many of the attempts of Analytic 
philosophers (interested in the logical/linguistic aspects of McTaggart’s problem) to 
grapple with the issue (Turetzky 1998, 126-27), but the general perspective perme-
ates many major approaches to time within the social sciences, including anthropol-
ogy and sociology.  Some of these have provided inspiration for recent manifesta-
tions of the measured/marked time distinction in archaeology. 
One version of this opposition is that between ‘irreversible’ or linear time and 
‘reversible’, cyclical time, a formulation initiated by the structuralist anthropologist 
Claude Lévi-Strauss and subsequently incorporated within the influential social the-
ory of Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1984, 35-6; Adam 1990, 25-8; Gell 1992, 23-9).  
Lévi-Strauss was interested in making a distinction between ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ socie-
ties (i.e., ‘primitive’ and Modern), with the former trapped in an ever-lasting present, 
upon which past and future were focused through the maintenance of tradition, in-
volving the enactment of rituals on a cyclical basis.  ‘Hot’ societies, in contrast, are 
open to change and more conscious of their position in an abstract, linear flow of 
history and fixed events (Adam 1990, 27-9; Gell 1992, 23-5, 286-93).  Although 
critical of certain aspects of Lévi-Strauss’ work (1979, 24-8), and developing impor-
tant innovations in temporal understandings in sociology in other respects (e.g. 1984, 
132-39), Giddens has made some use of the ideas of cold and hot societies (1984, 
199) and reversible and irreversible time (1984, 35), the latter to describe the differ-
ence between the time-scales of daily routine (as repetitive and cyclical) and of the 
Figure 1. The principal differences between B-series and A-series time. 
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individual human lifetime (as successive and linear).  Of course, the description of 
routine activities as bound in ‘reversible’ time is problematic (Adam 1990, 26-9): no 
two actions are actually the same because aspects of their context (including, mini-
mally, the age of the person performing them) have changed.  This is significant be-
cause, while routine is vitally important to the continuance of social life in all socie-
ties, it is equally critical (by virtue of being ‘irreversible’ and thus open to differen-
tiation) to social change.  All social life can thus be characterized in terms of a com-
plex balance between tradition and change or mobility (Gardner 2001, 272-3), with 
routines always being enacted in new contexts with new conditions of possibility. 
A different approach which has been influential in some social theory (including, 
again, the work of Giddens e.g. 1984, 110-19) and indeed in certain aspects of ar-
chaeology (e.g. Laurence 1994, 122-32) is the more explicitly B-series dominated 
‘Time-geography’ of Torsten Hägerstrand and the Lund School of social geogra-
phers.  This is a way of understanding the movements of people through time and 
space, and the opportunities or constraints that these movements afford them for so-
cial interaction, using temporal maps (fig. 2).  It can thus underpin interpretations of 
the structural qualities of social life, illuminating the ‘choreography’ of activities 
such as schooling, work, or domestic arrangements (Gell 1992, 190-205).  In a con-
text like Roman Pompeii, this can be translated into an analysis of the way the lives 
of the senatorial class, structured around movements (at certain times of the day) 
between home, forum and baths, differed from those of other social groups within 
the city (Laurence 1994, 122-32). 
It is undoubtedly vital to incorporate both time and space into any analysis of human 
action, and time-geography may, therefore, represent a useful modification to the 
typically static view of society embedded in much social theory (Adam 1990, 13; cf. 
May and Thrift (eds.) 2001, for more recent developments).  However, this example 
also illustrates the limitations of focusing upon one side of the A-/B-series dichot-
omy.  The characteristic method of ‘map’ representation in this approach is classi-
cally B-series, with time reduced to another dimension of space and possessing no 
unique qualities – once again, a container for, rather than a product of, human action.  
Closely related to time-geography, and suffering from the same fundamental prob-
lem, is sociological and anthropological work on ‘time-budgeting’, within which we 
might include the ‘optimal foraging theory’ which has had some influence in archae-
ology (Smith 1983; Mithen 1990; Gell 1992, 206-16).  This attempt to understand 
how people make ‘best’ use of their time, particularly in terms of resource acquisi-
tion, takes us back to the implicit acceptance of B-series time as natural Time, ren-
dering impossible any opportunity for individual or cultural variation with respect to 
temporal engagement. 
The dualistic approaches to time that these few examples illustrate in other disci-
plines can also be seen to be latent in some of the more recent attempts to deal with 
time in archaeology.  As noted above, Shanks and Tilley (1987a, 118-36) were – 
characteristically – in the forefront of raising questions about archaeological time-
concepts.  They identified the weaknesses in the prevailing traditional/processual 
position, with its unquestioning reliance on abstract Time, divorced from human 
practices and treated much like geometric space.  They also pinpointed problems in 
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the more elaborate and multi-scalar ‘time-perspectivist’ approach of Geoff Bailey, 
whose arguments actually tended to emphasise the long-term as the ‘proper’ preserve 
of archaeology, at the expense of a concern with smaller-scale practices (e.g. 1987, 
8). Even so, they were led in to a distinction between chronological, measured time 
(fundamentally associated for them with the capitalist mode of production) and sub-
jective, ‘marked’ time (1987, 127-29; cf. Zvelebil and Jordan 1999, 104).  There are 
certainly culturally-specific attitudes to temporality, one of which is the commodifi-
cation of time characteristic of capitalist societies.  These should not, however, be 
forced into a dualistic scheme which perpetuates the natural/social distinction – even 
if the ‘natural’ time is recognized as an ideological construct (cf. Bailey 1983, 168-9, 
where natural time is treated as objective).  This runs the risk of asserting that social 
time is the dominant side of the dualism, which in turn undermines the importance of 
recursive human engagement in the world (i.e. with material as well as social forces, 
through embodied Being) as the source of temporalities. 
Individuals and social groups experience temporality in many different ways (and 
this has certainly not been eradicated by the Modern commodification of time; Adam 
1994; Millard 2000).  To note, as Shanks and Tilley do (1987a, 129) that “they 
[marked and measured time] are not mutually exclusive: we can understand the time 
of the peasant, just as the peasant can understand chronology” does not go far 
Figure 2. Example of the kind of ‘time map’ produced in time-geographical ap-
proaches (cf. Gell 1992: 190-205) 
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enough.  To enslave Modern social agency to the factory clock, or pre-Modern social 
agency to the weight of tradition, does both a disservice and diminishes the impor-
tance of structuration – social transformation through social reproduction – in socie-
ties of all kinds (Giddens 1979, 114).  The fundamental character of human tempo-
rality (which does, indeed, share features with the times of other species) seamlessly 
combines both ‘marked’ and ‘measured’ features, depending both upon cyclical 
repetition (which Lévi-Strauss mistakenly labelled ‘reversible’ time) and linear suc-
cession as elements of social Being-in-the-world, in which ‘social’ and ‘natural’ 
spheres are mutually implicated to the extent of dissolving this distinction (cf. Ingold 
1986, 165; Adam 1990, 154-55; Murray 1999, 3; Urry 2000, 200-05). 
These themes do appear, in different guises, in the two major strands of more recent 
work on time in archaeology.  One of these strands is the attempt to draw upon 
‘chaos theory’ and non-linear dynamics to model complex, multi-temporal aspects of 
change, operating at levels greater than – but connected to – human agency 
(McGlade 1987; McGlade and van der Leeuw 1997; cf. Mizoguchi 2000).  While 
bearing important connections to certain developments in physics (see below), and 
drawing attention to the problematic issue of scale, such systems-based approaches 
can still tend to spatialize time as a container for activity, rather than as a mutually-
constitutive element of it.  Indeed, it is this latter understanding that the other major 
group of recent time-studies in archaeology has addressed (Gosden 1994; Thomas 
1996; Karlsson 2001).  This has involved the explicit adoption of a very different 
approach to temporality than those discussed above, drawing upon the ontology 
(theory of being) of Martin Heidegger.  It will be argued here that this perspective is 
an essential element in the dissolution of the dichotomy between natural and social 
times, though it is not without limitations when it comes to understanding some of 
the communal aspects of Being (the process through which beings exist) in pre-
Modern societies (Gosden 1994, 114; Dobres 2000, 84; cf. Dreyfus 1991, 141-51; 
Mulhall 1996, 62-74). 
Without going in to the details of what is a complex and shifting philosophy (see 
Thomas 1996, 1-91 and Karlsson 1998, 17-86 for summaries of Heidegger’s early 
and late phases of thought discussed within an archaeological context), Heidegger’s 
understanding of human Being (described by the specialist term Dasein) stresses 
involvement or dwelling in the world (mediated through the material equipment of 
everyday practice) and temporality as fundamental features of that Being.  With re-
gard to time, it is the inevitability of death that defines Dasein’s temporal character, 
and shapes past, present and future.  ‘Time’ is thus created in the actions of Dasein’s 
movement towards death, generated in the ongoing process of its ‘coming to 
be’ (Adam 1990, 30-1; Gosden 1994, 112; Turetzky 1998, 103-4; Urry 2000, 114-5).  
While this perspective (which bears similarities to Elias’ (1992, 43) substitution of 
the activity of timing for the concept of Time, and Mead’s (1932) emphasis on the 
constitutive nature of the present) has been labelled as essentially A-series and 
‘human’ (Gell 1992, 264-5), such a designation rests on the assumption that B-series 
time is ‘natural’.  This is not the case, as we will see in the next section. 
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Beyond the Dualism: Time and Agency 
The linkage between what have hitherto been regarded as ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ con-
tained in the concept of Being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962, 78-9) is appropriate to 
the task of reconceptualizing the relationship between ‘social’ and ‘natural’ times 
(cf. Giddens 1979, 3-4).  The three themes which cross the boundary inherent in this 
dualism, and which are essential to developing a theory of human agency in a way 
underpinned by an understanding of Being, are temporality, materiality and sociality.
Given the subject of this paper, I will focus on developing the first of these in more 
depth than the others, but certainly cannot exclude them entirely, as together they 
can be seen as constituting the meaningful dimensions of space from which tempo-
rality, in turn, cannot be divorced (cf. Ingold 1993). 
To summarise the position developed on temporality in this paper thus far, archae-
ology has moved from an implicit acceptance of chronological time as ‘natural’ 
Time, through a critical opposition of ‘measured’ time with ‘experienced’ time, and 
only recently to attempts to bind these in terms of multiple scales and tempos or, 
more fundamentally, of human involvement with ‘the world’.  While at each stage 
we have seen links with theories of time developed in other disciplines, whether 
physics, philosophy, anthropology or sociology, recent developments in some of 
these disciplines (effectively summarized in Adam 1990) allow us to elaborate a 
little further on the nature of this involvement, and to specify more clearly how the 
times of nature and culture, of cycle and arrow, can be regarded as a unified field of 
temporality which, in its varied facets, must be a key focus of archaeological re-
search.  Potential problems that this creates in the method of such research will be 
considered in the concluding section. 
Repetition and change are both features of the world with which we engage on a 
daily basis.  Regardless of how repetitive a particular practice is, it is never actually 
repeated identically; nonetheless, such routine actions fill our lives, and we depend 
upon them for our ongoing ontological security (Giddens 1984, 60-4; cf. Baert 1992, 
119-28).  Such actions are critical to understanding temporality as an aspect of, 
rather than a container for, human agency.  It can be argued that time is created in 
the actions, through the ongoing flow of doing, rather than existing as an abstract 
box which actions may or may not fill (Adam 1990, 30).  As noted above, this might 
be regarded as an A-series, context-dependent understanding of time – and therefore 
‘social’ – were it not the case that ‘natural’ time is increasingly comprehended in 
similar ways, rather than as being essentially B-series. 
Certainly, the lives of animals exhibit similar combinations of routine and transfor-
mation to humans, both in terms of biological processes (metabolism, ageing) and in 
terms of memory and anticipation of actions (Adam 1990, 70-90).  The clock time of 
the industrialized world is, in origin, no more than an abstraction from these proc-
esses, integrating the repetition of the hours of the day with the progress of calendar 
years (concepts both present in many pre-Modern societies).  As such, it only partly 
corresponds to the Newtonian ideal of absolute time, an ideal which is, in any case, 
no longer the only ‘time’ of physics.  Relativity and Quantum Theory have, first, 
made time context-dependent and, second, linked time to energy in the definition of 
sub-atomic particles as units of action, within which past (as history), present and 
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future (as probability) are all embedded features (Einstein 1954 [2001]: 23-29; 
Prigogine and Stengers 1984, 213-32, 291-313; Adam 1990, 48-69).  These develop-
ments have rarely been considered in archaeology (cf. McGlade 1999, 148), but 
bring the times of ‘nature’, in certain key respects, closer to the times of humans, 
even if there is great variety in rhythm and tempo (cf. Urry 2000, 157-60).  This 
means that temporality, as action – timing, not Time – can be regarded as a funda-
mental feature of ‘Being-in-the-world’, emergent from the properties of both ‘Being’ 
and ‘the world’.  It also renders arguments about whether A- or B-series time is more 
‘real’ somewhat meaningless. 
Building upon this argument, materiality and sociality are critical to ‘Being-in-’, and 
here we can employ further insights from current social theory.  Material culture is 
clearly of great importance in Dasein’s involvement with the world and with others.  
Indeed, many dimensions of identification (as an aspect of sociality) can be regarded 
as involving the hybridisation of embodied humans with material technologies, mu-
tually constitutive of ethnic, gender or other statuses (Urry 2000, 77-8).  Material 
cultures are also fundamental to the human experience of temporality, extending 
actions and interactions outwards from the present.  Equally important to agency, 
however, is the existence of other humans who, in conjunction with the material 
world, define the rules and resources (Giddens 1984, 17) which enable or constrain 
action.  No understanding of Dasein can be complete without considering the role 
that learning from others, or the institutionalisation of identities, has on ‘Being-with-
others’ (an important but under-developed element in Being and Time, dealing with 
the social dimensions of Being; Dreyfus 1991, 143).  As indeed with temporality and 
materiality, sociality is critical to the constitution of human agency, but is variable 
across and within different social groups.  It is through the elucidation of such vari-
ability that archaeologists have such an important contribution to make to other so-
cial sciences. 
Conclusions: Archaeological Times and Archaeologies of Temporality 
The theoretical exegesis which has comprised the bulk of this paper has addressed 
the history of time-concepts in archaeology, the links between these and other disci-
plinary traditions, and the development of an ontological approach which binds 
‘social’ and ‘natural’ time within the focal point of human agency.  Three key fields 
have been identified in the constitution of the latter – temporality, materiality, and 
sociality – which agency, as power to act in the world (cf. Barrett 2001), is depend-
ent upon.  It is appropriate now to consider how such an approach impacts upon ar-
chaeology as a practice itself, and some of the problems it raises.  For the purposes 
of this discussion, the goal of archaeological research will be treated as the transla-
tion and understanding of other modes of social agency or Dasein than those con-
structed in the Modern world (cf. Shanks and Tilley 1992, 114-15), with a view not 
to ‘reconstructing’ the past – that is, in essence, impossible – but to criticising the 
present.   
Insofar as such a task cannot begin without some pre-understanding of how to pro-
ceed, the general ontological position outlined above can be elaborated further.  The 
key to exploring the ongoing constitution of past social lives is practice.  An archae-
ology of temporality, materiality and sociality is necessarily an archaeology of prac-
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tices – the ways people do – encompassing everything that has been falsely divided 
into technological and ideational, or natural and cultural spheres (Dobres 2000, 10-
69).  Such an inclusive approach must equally be multi-faceted with respect to the 
kinds of archaeological data which are of interest.  Of course, many biases against 
the recording of certain kinds of material, such as ‘environmental’ finds, have long 
been discarded, but the problem of integration remains pernicious so long as, for 
example, animal bones and ceramics are treated separately in excavation publica-
tions, even though both relate to food (Hawkes 1999).  This integration becomes 
much less of a problem if we think in terms of practices – many of which will be 
routine, but which are always potentially open to discursive consideration and to 
change (Barrett 2001, 150-51) – which cross-cut material-based divisions.  In my 
own research (Gardner 2001, 219-29), I have developed an interpretation of a range 
of significant fields of practice which structure the archaeological data for Britain in 
the fourth century CE.  These include dwelling, appearing, eating, exchanging and 
working. 
With respect to timing, changing temporalities of some of these practices are dis-
cernible from different aspects of the material cultures used through this period.  For 
example, analysis of the relationship between the numbers of coins deposited at dif-
ferent points through the century, in conjunction with other stratigraphic information 
concerning the composition of layers, indicates that coins were more rapidly lost – or 
even discarded – in the later part of the fourth century (Gardner 2001, 110-17).  This 
relates in part to an increase in the availability of coinage, and probably to more 
widespread participation in practices of exchanging, but also represents a change in 
the temporal relations between people and things – coins which had hitherto been 
long-lived objects stretching back into history, like the empire which sanctioned their 
production, were now readily discarded.  This example also illustrates how an ar-
chaeology of practices must deal with the intersection of different fields of practice, 
thus drawing in many strands of temporality, materiality and sociality.  Thus, the 
pattern noted above is also partly to be accounted for in terms of changes in practices 
of dwelling, particularly the way in which certain kinds of building – again, often 
ones associated with state institutions – were given over to refuse disposal in the 
later fourth century.  The abandonment of one set of routine practices for another 
aptly illustrates the tensions, between different kinds of tradition and different kinds 
of transformation, which a temporal analysis of this period bring to the fore. 
This in turn leads to interpretations of the relationships between individuals and in-
stitutions, and therefore of different forms of sociality, which there is not space to 
address here.  Two problems are, however, raised through this example.  The first is 
that, once we discard the notion of trying to explain past social activity in terms of 
closed, timeless systems (cf. Barrett 2001, 155), hindsight becomes more of a hin-
drance than a help.  If, in accordance with the perspective outlined in this paper, we 
rather seek to understand something of past modes of Being, we must attempt to 
comprehend them in their becoming, not in what they became.  Secondly, and more 
significantly, we need to be sensitive to the implications of simultaneously situating
chronology as a particular understanding of temporality, grounded in Modernism, 
and using it as a tool for understanding other temporalities.  This, indeed, emphasizes 
the contradiction at the heart of archaeology (Shanks and Tilley 1992, 28, 110-15).  
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Kleinitz for her encouragement to get it 
done ‘in time’. 
As with excavation itself, we obliterate what we seek to understand.  In interpreting 
temporal relationships of other times we are forced to use our own temporal under-
standings, of days or years or lifetimes, of short or long timespans.  However, not 
only does a general understanding of the centrality of temporality to Being enable us 
to say something about it in varied contexts, but the irreconcilable conflict between 
categories of timing is in itself symptomatic of the constant movement – the herme-
neutic spiralling – which is to be welcomed as the defining feature of a self-critical 
archaeology. 
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